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Introduction  
Television remains by far the most popular way to follow live major sporting events and is at 
the heart of the ‘sports-media-business complex’ (Evens et. al, 2013). At the same time, 
however, as pointed out in a recent European Commission (DG Education and Culture) study 
on ‘sports organisers’ rights in the European Union’, the ‘traditional term sports 
broadcasting’ no longer reflects a ‘market reality’ where, as well as a traditional television 
set, consumers ‘increasingly use a range of internet-connected devices to watch sports: via 
PC, tablet, and smartphones’ (Asser Institute, 2014: 62). In this context, it makes more sense 
to refer to ‘sports media rights’, a term that ‘encompasses the rights to transmit audio-visual 
material across all transmission techniques’ (ibid). Or, put another way, the long heralded 
convergence of broadcasting, telecommunication and computing technologies is beginning to 
have a significant impact on the way that the rights to sporting events and competitions are 
sold and distributed. Over the last few years, this trend has been most clearly demonstrated 
by the growing prominence of leading traditional (often former state owned) 
telecommunications companies in the European sports media rights market, most notably 
British Telecom (BT) (UK), Deutsche Telekom (DT) (Germany), Orange/France Telecom 
(France) and Telefonica (Spain). Using these major European media markets as examples, the 
main object of this article is to examine the implications of spending on sports rights by 
telecommunications operators for both the sports media rights market and the wider European 
communications market.    
 The first part of the article focuses on the corporate strategies of traditional 
telecommunications operators and details how the acquisition of sports rights has been driven 
by a general desire to enhance their competitive position within an increasingly converged 
communications market. Just as importantly, however, it is also argued that the strategies 
adopted by individual telecommunications companies (and their successes or failures) have 
been shaped by the particular features of national markets, most notably the strength of pay-
TV rivals. Taking these two points together, this section highlights the continued and, if 
anything, growing significance of premium sports rights as a ‘site of struggle’ within 
contemporary media markets (Evens and Lefever, 2013). The second part of the article 
moves on to consider the regulation of the sports media rights market. In Europe (and 
beyond), the regulation of the sports media rights market focuses on two main areas: first, 
major events legislation (also commonly referred to as listed events or anti-siphoning 
legislation), designed to preserve free access to television coverage of major national or 
international sporting events, such as the Olympic Games, or the FIFA World Cup; and, 
secondly, the application of general competition law to the buying and selling of rights in 
order to facilitate free, fair and effective competition, which ultimately, at least in theory,  
benefits consumers. Elsewhere, we have argued that there remains a clear case for major 
events legislation to preserve/enhance cultural citizenship (Smith et. al, 2015). Here, our main 
focus is on how the growing involvement of traditional telecommunications operators in the 
European sports media rights market has underlined shortcomings in attempts to apply 
competition law principles to the buying and selling of premium sports rights. Specifically, 
the second part of the article begins by setting out how, over the last decade or so, regulatory 
attention at both European Union (EU) and national level has focused mainly on competition 
issues related to the (upstream) sports rights market (i.e. the selling of television rights by 
sporting organisations to broadcasters) and, in particular, the collective selling of rights by 
Europe’s leading football leagues and competitions. Here, it is argued that regulatory 
intervention intended to promote competition in both (upstream) sports rights and 
(downstream) pay-TV markets has, at best, proved only partially successful. To date at least, 
the application of competition law has benefitted sports organisations and (at least some) pay-
TV/telecoms operators, rather than consumers. Following on from this, the case is made for 
further regulatory intervention to facilitate increased competition in the (downstream) market 
for the distribution of sports channels/programming to consumers. In this way, regulators 
may be able to ensure that increased competition for sports rights between 
telecommunications operators and pay-TV broadcasters (as well as other possible market 
entrants) leads to improved services and lower prices for consumers, rather than merely 
escalating fees for sports rights that are then passed on to sports channel and/or broadband 
subscribers.   
 
Telecommunications Operators and the Sports Media Rights Market 
The commercial and strategic importance of sports rights for pay-TV (as well as some free-
to-air) broadcasters has been well documented (Boyle and Haynes, 2009). Over the last 
couple of decades or so, exclusive sports rights have been used, in Rupert Murdoch’s often 
quoted phrase, as a ‘battering ram’ to open up national pay-TV markets for broadcasters, such 
as BSkyB (UK), Canal Plus (France), DirecTV (US), Foxtel (Australia), MultiChoice (South 
Africa) and StarTV (Asia) (Evens et. al, 2013). Furthermore, the continued reliance of pay-
TV broadcasters on (live and exclusive) sports rights to retain/add subscribers and to increase 
average revenue per user (ARPU) has fuelled a global premium sports rights market 
estimated to be worth as much as $28 billion per annum (Deloitte, 2014). In short, the use of 
sport by pay-TV broadcasters has been a significant part of a mutually reinforcing trend 
toward the marketization of the television and sports industries (Murdock, 2000; Rowe, 
2004). At least partly as a result, intense competition for premium sports rights in Europe has 
also resulted in monopolistic pay-TV market structures and major corporate failures 
(Leandros and Tsourvakas, 2005). During the early 2000s, in an attempt to establish and/or 
challenge a dominant market position, a whole host of European pay-TV broadcasters 
overpaid for sports rights and faced the ‘winners curse’ of heavy losses and/or bankruptcy, 
including ITV Digital and Setanta (UK), Premiere (Germany), Telepìu and Stream (Italy) 
(which merged to form Sky Italia), Alpha Digital Synthesis (Greece), Quiero TV (Spain) and 
Sport7 (Netherlands). By the early 2000s, Europe’s national pay-TV markets had become 
‘winner-takes-all-markets’, largely dependent on the exclusive ownership of key sports rights 
(Cudd, 2007).  
 
Over the last decade or so, developments in digital distribution technology, such as high 
speed broadband, have paved the way for many of Europe’s established telecommunications 
operators to play a growing part within the television industry, either as distributors, or as 
vertically integrated distributors/content providers that compete directly with established pay-
TV broadcasters. Most significantly, telecommunications operators across Europe have 
attempted to use premium sports rights, commonly the rights to their respective national 
football championships, to promote new pay-TV services. For example, in 2005, Belgian 
telecom operator, Belgacom, became the first European telecommunications company to 
purchase live sports rights with a record €36 million per annum deal for the rights to the 
Belgian football championship designed to promote the take-up of its new IPTV service, 
Belgacom TV (Evens and Lefever, 2013). In a similar vein, a year later, having secured the 
IPTV rights for German Bundesliga matches, DT launched its T-Home Entertain service 
(Deutsche Telekom, 2015). And, in 2008, France Telecom, rebranded as Orange, launched 
Orange Sport, which was made available via its own ADSL network following a deal for the 
exclusive live rights to some Ligue 1 matches (Kuhn, 2011: 48). More recently, 
telecommunications operators have also secured exclusive live rights to at least some matches 
from their respective national football championships in Greece (OTE), Portugal (Portugal 
Telecom/Sport TV), Spain (Telefonica), Switzerland (Swiscom) and the UK (the English 
Premier League and the Scottish Premier League) (BT).  
 
To some extent, the growing involvement of telecommunications operators in the buying and 
distribution of premium sports rights is part of a wider change in the ‘media sport content 
economy’, whereby the growth of new media technology, chiefly the internet, mobile devices 
and social media, represent a shift from the long-established ‘broadcast model’ characterised 
by scarcity, with high barriers of access and costs restricting the number of media companies 
and sports organisations able to create, control and distribute popular sports content, to a 
‘networked model’ defined by ‘digital plenitude’ with new technology significantly lowering 
entry barriers to commercialise sports content (Hutchins and Rowe, 2009). At the same time, 
however, the availability of premium sports rights remains tightly controlled by leading 
sports organisations, such as Europe’s national football leagues, who are keen to preserve a 
major source of revenue and have made a concerted effort to ensure that any loss of value to 
their rights from breaches of copyright via illegal internet streams is relatively limited (Boyle, 
2015). Consequently, in an increasingly converged media environment, premium sports 
rights remain as important, if not more important, than ever. In fact, the commercial strategies 
adopted by some of Europe’s major telecommunications companies suggest that control of, 
or at the very least, guaranteed access to premium sports content has also become a key 
source of market power in the wider communications market beyond pay-TV.     
 
For Europe’s leading telecommunications operators the acquisition of premium sports rights 
is a vital part of a ‘triple play’ strategy, whereby they aim to preserve and/or expand their 
market position by bundling together over a single broadband connection multiple 
communication services, namely, internet access, digital television and fixed line telephony 
(possibly also integrated with a mobile phone service i.e. ‘quad play’). Using sports rights to 
attract/retain subscribers, telecommunications operators aim to establish a strong position 
from which to cross-sell bundled services. More specifically, ‘triple play’ strategies are 
attractive for telecommunications operators for a number of interrelated reasons: first, they 
facilitate the ‘locking in’ of subscribers, by raising the cost (and inconvenience) of switching 
to other providers (i.e. a lower ‘churn rate’); second, perhaps most importantly, ‘triply play’ 
strategies provide operators with the option to cross-subsidise one or more of their services 
depending on market conditions; and, third, in theory at least, additional revenues can be 
secured through improved customer service provision and service promotion (McGrail and 
Roberts, 2005). Furthermore, from a strategic perspective, the ability of telecommunications 
operators to offer a ‘one-stop-shop’ for bundled services provides them with a significant 
competitive advantage vis-à-vis pay-TV operators, who, in most, if not quite all, cases offer a 
standalone television subscription.  
 
The European telecommunications operator to have entered the sports rights market in the 
most aggressive fashion has arguably been BT, in the UK. In 2012, BT took most industry 
observers by surprise when it agreed a £738 million deal for the exclusive live rights to 38 
Premier League matches per season for three seasons (2013-14 – 2015-16). BT followed this 
up by acquiring the live rights to a number of other sports, including Premiership rugby and 
WTA tennis. By 2013, BT had spent over £2 billion on sports rights and had launched two 
dedicated sports channels, BT Sport 1 and 2 (Mance, 2013). In what was widely described as 
a ‘defensive strategy’ designed to protect BT’s core fixed line telecoms business, the new 
channels were then made available for no fee to new and existing BT broadband and/or BT 
TV subscribers (Budden and Thomas, 2012). According to some estimates, BT’s sports 
channels have cost it in excess of £200m per year (Hewlett, 2013a), but the use of premium 
sports content to anchor its ‘triple play’ strategy has, to date at least, proved a worthwhile 
investment. In 2012, BT was the UK’s leading fixed line broadband provider with just over 6 
million household subscribers, 29.4 per cent of the market (Ofcom, 2012). However, Sky 
(then BSkyB), the UK’s dominant pay-TV broadcaster, was already pursuing its own ‘triple 
play’ strategy having launched a broadband service six years earlier. By 2012, Sky had 
successfully converted around 40 per cent of its 10 million pay-TV subscribers to ‘triple play’ 
contracts and was set to increase this proportion, largely at the expense of BT, who, it was 
estimated, was likely to lose as much as £700 million of annual revenue (Hewlett, 2013b). 
Moreover, during 2011, Sky also accounted for more than half of net new broadband 
subscriber additions in the UK (Dunne, 2012). Faced with this situation, BT has used 
premium sports rights to stabilise its position in the UK broadband market. By the end of 
2013, BT Sport was reported to have attracted over 2 million subscribers, mostly from 
existing BT customers, and, just as, if not more importantly, BT had also signed up more than 
nine out of ten (156,000) of the UK’s net new broadband customers (Thomas, 2013a). By 
2015, BT had actually increased its share of the UK’s growing broadband market to 32 per 
cent, with around 7.7 million subscribers, and in doing so had retained its position as the 
UK’s leading broadband provider (Ofcom, 2015: 292). Furthermore, since the launch of BT 
Sport, BT has continued to invest heavily in premium sports rights. In 2013, BT agreed a 
£900 million deal for the exclusive UK live rights to UEFA Champions League and Europa 
League football for three seasons (2015-16 – 2017-18), which were previously shared 
between Sky and ITV (free-to-air) (Thomas, 2013b). And, most recently, in 2015, BT agreed 
to pay £960 million to offer exclusive live coverage of Premier League football (42 matches 
per season) for a further three seasons (2016-17 – 2018-19) (Gibson, 2015). Following the 
UEFA deal, ahead of the new 2015-16 football season, BT also launched a new sports 
channel, BT Sport Europe, available for free to BT TV subscribers, but not existing/new BT 
broadband customers, who are required to pay a relatively small (£5) monthly subscription 
fee. With this move, BT appears to have begun to shift away from a purely ‘defensive 
strategy’ and towards a more ambitious (and risky) approach designed to both increase BT 
TV’s relatively low share of the UK pay-TV market (around one million subscribers) and to 
increase the ARPU from existing BT broadband subscribers (Thomas, 2015; Mance and 
Thomas, 2015).    
  
In Spain, broadband and pay-TV markets have become just as, if not more, interwoven than 
in the UK. Following a series of mergers over the last few years, the Spanish communications 
market has become dominated by three main players each offering ‘triple play’ and/or ‘quad 
play’ packages, namely Vodafone, Orange and Telefonica. Of these three, Telefonica is the 
clear leader in the broadband market, with, by 2015, 5.88 million subscribers, a 44.3 per cent 
market share, compared to Vodafone’s 21.4 per cent (2.8 million subscribers) and Orange’s 
12 per cent (1.6 million subscribers) (Solana, 2015). Telefonica has also recently moved to 
extend its market leadership from broadband to pay-TV. In 2014, the telecoms operator 
agreed a €750 million deal with the Spanish media group, Prisa, and then a €350 million deal 
with the Italian media company, Mediaset, for 56 per cent and 22 per cent stakes respectively 
in Digital+, Spain’s leading pay-TV broadcaster (Del Valle, 2014a). Combined with its 
existing 22 per cent stake, these deals gave Telefonica full control of Digital+ and, when 
merged together with its existing pay-TV service, Movistar TV, meant that Telefonica 
became Spain’s leading pay-TV operator, with around 3 million subscribers, more than three 
times the number of its closest rival, Vodafone-ONO (Del Valle, 2014b). Just as 
significantly, Telefonica has publicly pronounced its intention to rely on premium sports 
rights to strengthen its position in Spain and beyond (Del Valle, 2015a). By using exclusive 
premium sports rights as part of a ‘triple/quad play strategy’ (Movistar Fusion TV), 
Telefonica plans to both differentiate itself from its rivals and also to grow the take-up of 
pay-TV in Spain, which, at 22 per cent in 2014, was relatively low when compared to other 
major European markets, such as France (76 per cent) and the UK (53 per cent) (Ofcom, 
2014a: 159). To this end, Telefonica has already secured the rights to a host of popular sports, 
such as Formula One and Moto GP, and has also agreed a landmark €600 million deal for the 
exclusive live rights to the top two divisions of Spanish league football, La Liga and the 
Segunda División, for the 2015/16 season, the first time that the rights to Spanish football 
have been sold collectively by the League, rather than by individual clubs (Nelson, 2015).  
 
Other major European telecommunications companies, however, have been less successful in 
their attempts to base ‘triple play’ packages on exclusive premium sports rights. In France 
and Germany, telecoms operators have faced intense competition for rights from new and 
established pay-TV broadcasters respectively. Faced with such competition, and no doubt 
keen to avoid the corporate failures experienced by some pay-TV broadcasters during the 
early 2000s, telecoms operators have opted to recast themselves as purely distributors and 
thus at least retain access to premium sports programming for their subscribers. Specifically, 
in France, in 2011, when the Qatar based broadcaster, Al Jazeera (later rebranded as beIN 
Sports) entered the bidding for Ligue 1 matches, Orange opted not to bid to renew its deal 
with Ligue 1. Instead, in 2012, with cumulative losses estimated at around €1.2 billion, 
Orange announced the closure of Orange Sport and agreed a long term deal to distribute Al-
Jazeera’s two beIN Sports channels, which subsequently also secured exclusive live rights to 
the majority of UEFA Champions League football matches, as well as some Ligue 1 matches 
(Enders Analysis, 2012; Boxell and Thompson, 2011). Similarly, in Germany, in 2012, DT 
was outbid for live Bundesliga football rights by the satellite pay-TV broadcaster, Sky 
Deutschland, who, in a deal worth around €486 million per season, acquired the exclusive 
live rights for both IPTV and pay-TV, for four seasons from August 2013 (Wiesmann, 2012). 
Faced with the prospect of losing many of its T-Entertain subscribers to Sky, DT agreed a 
distribution deal for Sky’s Bundesliga package, Liga Total, and subsequently withdrew from 
the premium sports rights market (Sheahan and Bryan, 2013).  
 
Taken together, these examples serve to underline the importance attached to premium sports 
rights by both traditional telecommunications operators and pay-TV broadcasters. The 
ownership of premium sports rights has become a key source of market power in the 
increasingly converged European pay-TV and broadband communication markets. It is 
perhaps no surprise therefore that the buying, selling and distribution of sports rights has long 
attracted the attention of competition authorities across Europe, and continues to do so.   
 
Competition Regulation and the Sports Media Rights Market  
The late 1990s and early 2000s witnessed a steady stream of competition cases at both EU 
and national level focused on the buying and selling of premium sports rights (Smith et al, 
2015). Prompted by the ‘battering ram’ strategies of Europe’s leading pay-TV broadcasters, 
competition authorities were principally concerned with the anti-competitive impact of the 
collective selling of live rights by Europe’s top football leagues and competitions. Critics 
argued that collective selling enabled leagues to act like cartels so as to maximise the value of 
their rights, which, in turn, strengthened the market position of already dominant pay-TV 
broadcasters, as they were the only ones who could afford to purchase the rights. In theory, if 
broadcast rights were sold by individual clubs, there would be more possibilities for other 
broadcasters to obtain rights, which, in turn, would foster competition in (downstream) pay-
TV markets. Alternatively, supporters of collective selling claimed that the principles of 
competition law could/should not to be applied to sporting leagues, not least because the 
selling of rights (to home matches) by individual teams would lead to vast income 
discrepancies and undermine competitive balance within a league. Weighing up both sides of 
the argument, in a landmark case on the selling of media rights to the UEFA Champions 
League, the European Commission’s Competition Directorate opted to allow collective 
selling, but only with the introduction of measures designed to ensure greater competition for 
rights, most notably the division of television rights into a number of smaller packages, three 
year limits on the lengths of exclusive contracts and the unbundling of new media rights 
(from live television rights) (EC, 2003). The European Commission then applied the same 
logic in its rulings on the selling of the rights to the Bundesliga and the Premier League, in 
Germany and the UK respectively (EC2005a; EC2005b). Furthermore, following the EU’s 
lead, national competition authorities also subsequently widely permitted the collective 
selling of football rights by their national championships, as long as the practise is 
accompanied by similar conditions to those imposed by the Commission (Asser Institute, 
2013: 78).  
 
Since around the early 2000s, the modified approach to collective selling implemented by 
Europe’s leading football competitions has certainly facilitated increased competition for 
rights. In France, the leading pay TV broadcaster, Canal Plus, has faced competition from a 
series of new entrants, each able to secure exclusive rights to some Ligue 1 matches, namely 
Télévision Par Satellite (TPS), Orange and beIN Sports. Similarly, in the UK, the regulated 
selling of Premier League rights enabled, first, the Irish based pay-TV broadcaster, Setanta, 
and, more recently, BT, to acquire exclusive rights to packages of matches. And, in Germany, 
the unbundling of new media rights (from television rights), enabled DT to launch its IPTV 
service as a rival to satellite pay-TV broadcaster, Premiere/Sky Deutschland. Beyond this, 
however, there exists a ‘major discrepancy’ between the aspiration frequently proclaimed by 
the Commission in its rulings on collective selling to ensure ‘greater choice and better value’ 
for consumers and the market reality (Lefever and Van Rompuy, 2009). First, the increased 
competition provided by new entrants to pay-TV markets has often proved relatively short-
lived. As already noted, over spending on premium football rights during the early 2000s led 
to a number of high profile corporate failures in European pay-TV markets, including, TPS, 
Orange Sport, Setanta and Premiere. Second, where competition has endured it has most 
often merely meant the replacement of a monopoly with a duopoly, namely: Sky and BT 
(UK); Canal Plus and beIN Sports (France); and, DT and Sky Deutschland (Germany). And 
thirdly, most significantly, the emergence of pay-TV duopolies has contributed to a rapid 
escalation in the cost of premium rights, which has then, to at least some extent, been passed 
on to consumers. Paradoxically, for consumers, increased competition in the sports media 
rights market has led to higher prices.  
 
In France, during the early 2000s, competition between Canal Plus and TPS produced a 26.6 
per cent CAGR increase in the value of the live rights to Ligue 1 matches, until the two rivals 
agreed a merger in 2005 (Ofcom, 2007a: 9). To the frustration of Canal Plus, the increased 
value of Ligue 1 rights was then sustained by the entry of Orange into the market and, more 
recently, competition from beIN Sports has led to a 20 per cent annual increase in the total 
amount paid for live rights, to €726.5m per year (between 2016 -2020) (Ligue 1, 2014). In 
Germany, competition for Bundesliga rights has been just as intense. In 2012, Sky 
Deutschland outbid DT and agreed to pay €486 million per season to secure both the 
exclusive live pay-TV and IPTV Bundesliga rights for four seasons from August 2013, 
leading to a 52 per cent increase in the total value of the rights (Wiesmann, 2012). Even more 
starkly, in the UK, competition between Setanta and Sky directly facilitated by EU 
regulation, which prevented any single bidder from acquiring all available packages of live 
rights, led to an increase of over 60 per cent in the value of the exclusive live rights to 
Premier League matches (between 2007/8 2009/10) (Ofcom, 2007b: 19). The entry of BT 
into the market has further inflated the value of Premier League rights, with the value of live 
rights increasing by a staggering 70 per cent at each of the last two rights auctions, in 2012 
and 2015, from £1.78 billion to around £3 billion and then to over £5.1 billion (Gibson, 
2015). 
 
The rapid escalation in the value of premium sports rights has obviously benefitted sports 
organisations, most notably Europe’s leading football clubs (and players), but it has produced 
less favourable outcomes for consumers. Given the monumental rise in the value of UK 
sports rights, it is perhaps no surprise that subscribers to sports channels in the UK have faced 
some of the steepest price increases in Europe. Ofcom’s (2014b) report on the ‘cost and value 
of communications services in the UK’ since 2004, declared that, over the last decade, 
increased competition had ‘underpinned declines in real prices’, particularly for broadband 
access. However, pay-TV was deemed to be an exceptional case. According to Ofcom, 
subscribers to Sky’s sports channels had experienced ‘real terms price increases’ of 21.6 per 
cent and subscribers to Sky’s sports channels via Virgin Media, the UK’s leading cable 
broadcaster, had faced even steeper price rises (23.7 per cent) (Ofcom, 2014b: 12-13). 
Furthermore, BT’s entry into the sports rights market has provided fresh impetus to the 
upwards trend in the cost of UK sports channels. According to research from Kantar Media, 
the average cost of watching top flight English football on television in the UK has soared 
since 2009 (Mann, 2015). Most notably, in 2014 alone, Sky increased the price of Sky Sports 
by 10 per cent, and, at least partly as a result, around one third of sports channel viewers were 
estimated to be struggling to pay their subscription (ibid.). Just as significantly, consumers 
who do not subscribe to sports channels have also faced increased charges as a result of the 
spiralling fess paid for sports rights. In 2014, BT imposed a 6.49 per cent increase in the cost 
of home phone and broadband packages on all its customers, a move described by some 
industry observers as a ‘football tax’ (Brignall, 2014). Similarly, in 2015, Sky raised the cost 
of its sports channel package by £1 per month, but its main ‘family bundle’ was increased by 
£3 per month, leading to suspicions that ‘family bundle’ subscribers were helping to pay for 
the latest Premier League rights deal (Snoddy, 2015). And finally, sports channel subscribers 
have also faced the inconvenience (as well as extra cost) of subscriptions to multiple pay-TV 
providers in order to follow all of the matches within a particular competition. This has 
become a defining feature of numerous European pay-TV markets, including the UK, France 
and Spain. For instance, a recent survey found that  the most expensive country in Europe for 
watching football on television was Spain, due to the ‘maze’ of different pay-TV and pay-
per-view packages viewers are required to negotiate in order to watch certain matches, 
including those featuring the two most popular teams, Real Madrid and Barcelona (Clover, 
2014). Against this background, it is perhaps no surprise that the viewing of live matches via 
illegal streams broadcast on the internet is an increasing common practice in many European 
countries. Indeed, according to recent research from the European Union Intellectual Property 
Office (EUIPO), illegal viewing was most common in Spain, with around 33 per cent of 15-
24 year olds using illegal sources to access online content, including live football matches 
(Clancy, 2016).For consumers to benefit from the increased competition in the sports media 
rights market, policy makers and competition authorities need to turn their attention to the 
regulation of the (downstream) sports programming distribution market i.e. the retail market. 
One way to address the use (and abuse) of exclusive sports programming as a source of 
market power within pay-TV and wider communications markets would be to treat premium 
sports rights in accordance with the ‘essential facilities doctrine’, which is an established 
feature of EU communications regulation (Smith, 2007). The ‘essential facilities doctrine’ 
effectively denotes that certain upstream (i.e. sports rights) inputs are essential/indispensable 
for downstream content providers/aggregators (e.g. pay-TV broadcasters or telecoms 
operators) to compete in the relevant market (i.e. sports programming) and cannot easily be 
replicated without significantly raising costs. Following on from this, to facilitate 
competition, access is provided to the ‘essential facility’ for all market players on ‘fair, 
reasonable and non-discriminatory’ terms, which are overseen by broadcasting and/or 
competition regulators.  
 
To some extent, this approach has already been adopted as the basis for the regulation of the 
premium sports programming market in Europe. In the UK, following an exhaustive (2007-
10) review of the UK pay-TV market, Ofcom has overseen a ‘wholesale-must-offer’ (WMO) 
regime, which compels Sky to offer its premium sports channels (Sky Sports 1 and Sky 
Sports 2) to other outlets on a wholesale basis at prices regulated by Ofcom (Ofcom, 2010). 
In France, in 2009, similar thinking underpinned a ruling from the Conseil de la concurrence, 
which prevented Orange from making access to Orange Sports exclusive to its own ADSL 
delivery platform (Ferla, 2009). And finally, since the early 2000s, a whole host of mergers 
between European pay-TV operators have been accompanied by regulations to guarantee the 
wholesale provision of premium sports channels to other broadcasters and/or delivery 
platforms, including in Spain (between Via Digital and Sogecable to form Digital+, as well as 
more recently between Telefonica and Digital+) and France (between TPS and Canal Satellite 
to form Canal+ France) (Ofcom, 2009). However, to varying degrees, these examples have 
also highlighted the piecemeal and often limited application of the essential facilities 
doctrine. For example, despite its recent spending on premium sports rights, Ofcom’s WMO 
regime has not been extended to BT, which has enabled the telecoms operator to opt to 
provide its sports channels to commercially attractive delivery platforms with large numbers 
of subscribers (i.e. Sky and Virgin Media), but not to smaller (and potential rival) platforms, 
such as Talk Talk/YouView (Ofcom, 2014c: 68-70). Just as importantly, one of the most 
controversial aspects of Telefonica’s takeover of Digital+ has been the Spanish competition 
authority’s ruling that Telefonica be obliged to give rival operators, Orange and Vodafone, 
access to only 50 per cent of its premium content (Del Valle, 2015b).  
 
A more systematic application of the essential facilities doctrine could be implemented to 
apply to all premium content and all delivery platforms. No doubt major sports organisations, 
such as Europe’s major football leagues (and at least some pay-TV/telecoms operators), 
would oppose any such move on the grounds that it would fatally undermine the commercial 
value of the sports media rights market, but this need not be the case. Curtailing the ability of 
pay-TV and/or telecoms operators (and/or other content aggregators) to offer premium sports 
programming on an exclusive basis may well dampen the inflation in the sports rights market, 
but, by definition, premium content is likely to remain popular with consumers. Pay-
TV/telecoms operators would therefore still no doubt be able to raise considerable revenue 
from the sale of highly popular sports programming. Only with this approach the value of 
premium content would be decoupled from the delivery platform, allowing consumers to 
select more freely from competing service providers, who, in turn, would be forced to 
compete in areas other than offering exclusive access premium sports content, such as price, 
performance, technological innovation and customer service. As a result, the fully-fledged 
application of the essential facilities doctrine to premium sports content regulation could also 
encourage a move away from a ‘winner takes all’ sports media rights market towards one 
based more on revenue sharing between content providers and sports organisations, which in 
the long term could benefit them both.  
 
Finally, it is worth noting that ongoing interrelated technological, market and regulatory 
developments are likely to increase the salience of the essential facilities doctrine to the 
regulation of the premium sports media rights market. First, the growing trend towards 
convergence means that premium sports rights are increasingly being marketed and/or 
acquired on a technologically neutral basis, with rights distinguished on a temporal basis (e.g. 
live, near-live, highlights, clips etc.), rather than by means of delivery. This has long been the 
approach adopted by some rights owners, such as the Premier League, but recent rights 
auctions have also seen movement in this direction from other leading European football 
leagues. Second, the EU’s approach to the regulation of sports media rights could see a shift 
away from national markets and towards a pan-European market. In 2011, the ruling of the 
European Court of Justice in the ‘Murphy case’ made it clear that the way that rights are 
currently sold on a territory-by-territory basis is ‘irreconcilable’ with the single internal 
market (EC, 2012). A combination of ‘cultural reasons’ and the nationally focused strategies 
employed by rights holders may well mean that there is little immediate prospect of a pan-
European rights market (Boyle, 2015), but the European Commission’s (2015) Digital Single 
Market Strategy signalled that movement in this direction remains a political priority (EC, 
2015). Thirdly, major commercial players have also moved to enhance their ability to 
purchase and/or distribute sports rights on a pan-European level. Most significantly, in 2014, 
Sky, completed the £7 billion acquisition of Sky Italia and Sky Deutschland (Hammett, 2014) 
and, a year later, the US based Discovery Communication completed its takeover of the pan-
European sports broadcaster, Eurosport, which just a few months earlier had agreed a £920 
million deal for the exclusive TV and online rights to the Olympics and Winter Olympics 
across Europe from 2018 to 2024 (White, 2015). Furthermore, as well as pan-European 
broadcasters and telecommunications operators, global Over-The-Top (OTT) providers, such 
as Netflix and Amazon, may also look to enter a pan-European premium sports rights market. 
Indeed, following the 2015 Premier League rights auction, the League’s chief executive, 
Richard Scudamore, noted that some bids had come from ‘the digital space’ and suggested 
that OTT providers could be significant contenders for rights in future (Farber, 2015) Taken 
together, these developments suggest that the European sports media rights market is likely to 
become increasingly dominated by major vertically-integrated transnational media 
corporations. In this context, the regulation of commercial power in the sports programming 
market to protect the interests of European consumers (and citizens) will be more important 
than ever.     
 
Conclusion  
Using France, Germany, Spain and the UK as examples, this article has highlighted the 
commercial and regulatory significance of the increasingly prominent role played by 
traditional telecommunications operators in the European sports media rights market. More 
specifically, several key points should be emphasised. First, premium sports rights have 
become a key source of market power in both the pay-TV and wider communications market. 
For telecommunications operators (and some pay-TV broadcasters) premium sports rights 
have become a vital part of ‘triple play’ strategies employed to ensure a competitive position 
in the increasingly converged pay-TV and broadband markets. Second, the implementation of 
the ‘triple play’ strategies adopted by telecommunication operators has been shaped by the 
particular features of national markets, most significantly the level of competition from pay-
TV rivals. For BT and Telefonica the acquisition of premium sports rights have been used to 
defend an existing market position in the broadband market and/or translate a dominate 
position in broadband to pay-TV. By contrast, in France and Germany, new and/or existing 
pay-TV broadcasters have moved to prevent telecommunications operators from pursuing 
similar strategies. Faced with such competition, Orange and DT have opted to position 
themselves as distributors, rather than risk overpaying for sports rights. Third, to date at least 
regulatory attempts to promote competition in the sports media rights market and, in turn, 
(downstream) pay-TV markets, have been only a limited success. Pay-TV monopolies in 
some countries, such as the UK and France, have been ended, but reforms to the 
arrangements used by Europe’s leading football leagues and competitions to sell their rights 
have also contributed to a rapid escalation in the value of rights, which has benefitted rights 
owners at the expense of consumers. Finally, to ensure that increased competition for sports 
rights translates into benefits for consumers, policy makers and regulators should turn their 
attention to the regulation of the (downstream) sports programming market. The more 
systematic application of the essential facilities doctrine to the sports programming market 
offers a possible means to end the ‘winner takes all’ approach to the auctioning of sports 
rights, while still enabling content providers and/or sports organisations to secure revenue 
based on the popularity of their programming/sport with consumers. Just as, if not more 
significantly, consumers would also be likely to benefit because pay-TV/telecoms providers 
would be forced to compete on the basis of price and quality of service, rather than merely 
the exclusive availability of premium sports content. In short, the application of the essential 
facilities doctrine to the sports programming market could serve the interests of pay-
TV/telecoms operators, sports organisations and consumers.  
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